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THE COMMUNICATION OF LIMITS: CHRIST, THE COMMUNICATIO 























“As long as disability is addressed in terms of the themes of sin-disability 
conflation, virtuous suffering, or charitable action, it will be seen primarily as a 
fate to be avoided… rather than an ordinary life to be lived.”1 
 
 The above quote from Disability Theologian Nancy Eiesland is exemplary 
of a theme that runs through the literature of Disability Theology: that people 
with disabilities are often treated as heroes, survivors, symbols of virtuous 
suffering, objects of repulsion, and/or any number of other caricatures, especially 
within the church. I use the term “caricatures” because a common experience for 
people with disabilities is to find a few of their attributes are exaggerated, in the 
eyes of others, and the rest of their identity is lost to these exaggerated features. 
This experience leaves a lopsided and ultimately diminished view of the person; 
in short, a caricature. While people with disabilities may indeed be heroic, may 
be suffering, or may find themselves the object of others’ repulsion, the person 
and their identity is almost always lost in whatever ill formed idea the person is 
presumed to symbolize. Furthermore, people with disabilities who are treated as 
such symbols may not identify themselves under these categories at all and such 
inappropriate symbolizations do an inherent violence to their identity by 
imposing a role which the individual may not, and in many cases absolutely 





 In this thesis, I draw on the work of Disability Theologians, Disability 
Scholars, and the Christological notion of the communicatio idiomatum to suggest 
that those of us in the church ought to transform our conceptualization of people 
with disabilities. This transformation should take us from thinking of people 
with disabilities as dependent, unfortunate, and deserving of our pity to 
conceiving of them as autonomous2, made in the Imago Dei, and deserving of our 
respect. The initial sections give a detailed presentation of the varying views of 
disability, followed by a very particular view of Christology. I will then move 
into some of the practices that have been suggested for the church in its 
interactions with people with disabilities and on their behalf. The ultimate goal is 
that readers transform their approach to people with disabilities both 
conceptually and practically. This transformation should lead us to interact with 
individuals with disabilities in ways that allow these people to define and 
express their own identities and limitations, in their own time, with their own 
language. Likewise, I hope that those who interact with these same people might 
have some grasp on how they can cease to impose their own ideas about 







An important, guiding question for our consideration is: how might 
people with disabilities be conceived of differently in light of how we conceive of 
the nature of our savior, the particularities of his incarnation, death and 
resurrection, and the limits that all people posses? I suspect that some of the 
ideas presented here will be applicable and practical for people outside the 
church as well, especially for any person who sees an intrinsic value in human 
life and the diversity of human expression. 
 
Terms for Disability 
 
 I should state from the start that I am disabled. Though the particular 
defect that causes me to be disabled is congenital, and as such has been with me 
for my whole life, it was not until late in my undergraduate years that I ever 
considered identifying myself as a person with a disability. I had always 
considered having Brachydactyly (the genetic disorder I possess that causes my 
fingers and toes to be significantly shorter than average) to be merely a fact of 
my life, not a qualifier for inclusion in any specific group. It was part of my 
identity the same way that being the youngest child was: only incidentally. 
Though I have always been keenly aware of the limitations inherent in my 
condition, I had never thought of myself primarily as a person who was any “less 
able” than most people in most regards, though I certainly possess limitations 
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that the average person does not. As an example, I cannot easily hold most 
beverage cans so I crush them part way to make them easier to hang onto, the 
chords on the banjo are not easily formed for me so I use an alternate tuning, and 
when change falls to the back of the coin return on a vending machine I know 
that I will not be the one retrieving my coinage. Yet despite these limitations, for 
a long time I primarily thought of myself as having an atypical body, not a 
disability. I realize now that at that time I was conflating disability with less 
ability, a problematic perspective that I was not alone in holding. 
 Though I often prefer to think of myself as having an atypical body, rather 
than being disabled, throughout the course of this thesis I primarily use the 
terms “people with disabilities”3 and “people with nonconventional bodies,”4 
(the latter being a category I have always been much more comfortable putting 
myself in) to talk about those whom most would call “the disabled” or “disabled 
people.” The first term is the one that seems to be most widely used in both 
disability theology and disability studies. While its phrasing may seem 












whom we are speaking are, first and foremost, people, which is crucial to our 
understanding of identity. However, many people, the author included, who are 
often lumped into the category of “people with disabilities” do not wish to have 
themselves thought of in terms that focus on a disability/ability binary. This is 
also why I personally find the term “differently abled” quite off-putting. While it 
breaks the binary, the term still focuses its categorization on arbitrary measures 
of capacity or “ability;” different, dis-, or otherwise, it should not be the focus of 
our categories. Rather than placing themselves somewhere on an ability scale, 
some people with disabilities prefer to think of their bodies as nonconventional 
or atypical. Given that “nonconventional bodies” is more widely used than 
“atypical bodies” in the literature, I will continue with that trend here. 
 A final, important point to be made about how one talks about people 
with disabilities is in the distinction between an impairment, a handicap, and a 
disability. While these words may seem to convey the same notion, their 
meanings are different, different enough that a brief overview is worthwhile for 
the sake of understanding what follows. First, an impairment lies within the 
individual. This is typically a feature that is abnormal or a function of some sort 
that is lost to this person. Missing arms, an under-functioning portion of the 
brain, or short fingers would would fit this category. A disability is what follows 
from the impairment and is based on the interaction between the person and the 
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person’s physical world. A person may not be able to safely drive a car with 
certain types of brain damage, or be able to easily grip some cups with small 
fingers and this would constitute a disability. Finally, a handicap follows from 
the disability as an expectation that society imposes upon individuals, which the 
individual cannot live up to. The person with brain damage may want to live in a 
very rural area but without the ability to drive, the person must rely on public 
transportation or the good will of their neighbors, both of which may be severely 
lacking. Take note here that the sources of the limitations described include the 
individual’s body, the incidental nature of the world around them, and/or 
broader human society and its intentional and unintentional constructs. This will 
be part and parcel of what drives the discussion of how we understand 
disability.5 
 
Historic Understandings of Disability 
 
 While we are here thinking of disability as a social force, as per the 
previous definitions, disability has been conceptualized in a myriad of ways 








Americans have thought of “disability”6 in drastically different terms in different 
centuries. Consider that before European settlers arrived, Indigenous American 
people thought of “disability” primarily in terms of a disharmony between mind, 
body, and spirit.7 This is a conceptualization that I find quite appealing and that I 
imagine many theologians could make good use of. Disability historian Kim 
Nielsen explains that for Indigenous Americans, because many of their 
“worldviews rested on the core belief that all had gifts, aging and the bodily 
changes that accompanied it did not lead to an assumption of diminished 
capacity.”8 In essence, for Indigenous Americans, the body had not been so 
idealized that variations were viewed negatively. 
Around the time many of the New England colonies were being 
established, most of the European settlers thought of “disability” as the lack of 
capacity to do meaningful work.9 As such, some people with readily apparent 
mental impediments were still entrusted to be teachers or given other significant 













to work) even though they had a mental impairment.10 This same attitude 
continued through the antebellum period11 and well into the early twentieth 
century as well. After the Civil War, and again after the First World War, 
disability became valorized for some individuals as society upheld disabled, 
male, mostly white, veterans for their service and conceived of their impairments 
and handicaps as the byproduct of meaningful sacrifices made for the nation.12 
Closely related to this mindset, shortly after the end of the First World War 
distinctions began to be made separating the “successful” from the “begging 
type” of cripples, the supposedly “successful” being those who could 
independently make a living.13 In the early twentieth century the eugenics 
movement had a prominent and problematic combination with societal 
assumptions about the handicaps of people with disabilities. The result was that 
by the early 1960’s, about 65,000 people with disabilities had been legally 
sterilized in forced sterilizations.14 Around this time disability activists were 
beginning to coalesce more and more with the disability equivalent of the Civil 












Disabilities Act, more commonly known as the ADA. This created a myriad of 
protections and aids for people with disabilities. Unfortunately, many religious 
institutions also sought to exempt themselves from these rules. 
These varied conceptualizations of disability across just a few centuries, in 
one country, certainly leads to more questions. When did we begin to idealize 
the body and the mind such that we no longer trusted people with disabilities to 
work? When did we decide that we needed to lock some people away in 
institutions? Further research into the history of disability could certainly yield 
interesting answers to these questions, but the transformation of the American 
conceptualization of disability from simple notions of psycho-spiritual-physical 
disharmony to “unsuccessful cripple” represents an unhealthy change. A change 
that distances the person with a disability from the physically or cognitively  
“typical” person. Some of our contemporary models open this gap further, while 
others attempt to close it. 
 
Modern Models of Disability 
 
Today, disability is still defined in a variety of ways and it would be hard 
to argue that any one model for conceptualization is “right” as each one has its 
own benefits and shortcomings. That said, there are certainly preferences 
amongst scholars and people with disabilities.  
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The Medical Model 
Up until the mid 1990’s and the passing of the ADA, what is commonly 
known as the Medical Model of disability was the preeminent model for 
understanding disability. Essentially, this model assumes that most people have 
“normal” bodies that function “normally” but some people have diagnosable 
variations which may or may not be “treatable” to varying degrees allowing 
them to come closer to some certain, abstract level of “normalcy.” While this 
model has been largely rejected by people with disabilities, there is value in this 
model in that it takes care and treatments seriously. People with disabilities, 
being understood through this model, are often offered a variety of ways to 
overcome their impairments. The varying forms of treatment that exist because 
of this way of thinking can often drastically decrease the physical or cognitive 
limits of a person’s disability. Such assistance might not exist if one were to focus 
primarily on other understandings of disability instead. Examples of such limits 
being reduced might include a person with MS being able to use a wheelchair for 
easier mobility in a highly mobile society or a person who is hard of hearing 
using hearing aids for the sake of being able to interact with individuals who 
may not know sign language. Nevertheless, this approach is often considered to 
be highly unhospitable to people with disabilities as it often assumes that the 
The	Communication	of	Limits	 11	
way an individual body is in the world should be changed to conform to a more 
medically normal standard. One who is deaf may feel pressure from the non-
deaf community to receive a cochlear implant or other form of hearing aid when 
in fact they have no desire to hear because they are already a welcome member 
of, and effective communicator in, the deaf community.  
 
Social or Minority Group Model 
 Since the advent of the ADA, the more popular model for understanding 
disability has been the Social or Minority Group Model. Nielsen points to 
rhetoric used shortly after World War II by disability activists to state that society 
was what was causing disability for those who were mentally or physically 
impaired.15 The conceptual origins of the Minority Model itself come from the 
Independent Living Movement in Berkley in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s.16 
Disability scholars Elizabeth DePoy and Stephen French Gilson state that the 
notion of “disability” being largely social was first put into legislation in the 
United Kingdom in the 1970’s.17 By the 1990’s, much of the political action that 









on the fact that many people with disabilities felt that, though their disabilities 
often varied greatly, they generally considered themselves to have a common 
social experience of disability,18 what we might consider something of a common 
identity. 
This is the basic essence of the Social or Minority Group Model of 
Disability: those with nonconventional bodies often find themselves impeded by 
societies views of and/or lack of accommodations for their physical or cognitive 
impairments. While there may still very well be variations in the social 
experience of people with disabilities based on such factors as the visibility of 
their disability, whether their disability is congenital, when the onset of their 
disability occurred and a host of other factors, a “common set of stigmatizing 
values and arrangements”19 has caused many people with disabilities to argue 
that they constitute a minority group. Rather than setting people with disabilities 
apart for their variations from the medical “norm,” they are set apart, in this 
model, by how society responds to them. This allows for a rallying point that 
does not coalesce around a sense of being aberrant, but a sense of comradery in 






My own sense of comradery with people with disabilities did not develop, 
unsurprisingly, until I began to think of myself as a person with a disability. 
Whether it was pride or simple ignorance, I had no sense of identification or 
comradery with other people with disabilities. This changed drastically when 
one of my undergraduate theology professors, and fellow individual with a 
disability, stated to me that, “the world was not made with people like us in 
mind.” While his disability and my own are rather different, this statement 
instilled in me a sense of familiarity between our experiences, a certain shared 
identity. It also put words to something that I had known to be true for years, but 
had never realized that I needed to hear affirmed by someone else. 
This moment caused a low-grade paradigm shift for me as “disability” 
ceased to be about what “people like that” cannot do, but how “people like us” 
have often experienced exclusion or stigmatization by virtue of our impairments. 
I think this model can be a productive starting point for transforming our 
conceptualization of people with disability. Perhaps a neurotypical person with a 
conventional body might be able to ask themselves, upon meeting a person with 
a disability, “how can this person be included?” instead of “what’s wrong with 
them?” Or maybe the question could change to, “how has this person been 
received and how should I receive them?” and not “I wonder what their disorder 
is called?” Can we change our questions, internal or external, from centering 
The	Communication	of	Limits	 14	
around ability to centering around identity? This happens in our other every day 
conversations as we lead with questions about employment, family, hobbies, etc. 
all of which can be major identity pieces. Why not work in these same terms as 
we approach people with disabilities? Finally, there is a level to which this 
transformation needs to happen for people with disabilities as well, as I know 
that some of us distance ourselves from other people with disabilities because we 
may call ourselves “disabled,” but we do not want to think of ourselves as that 
disabled, whether the distinction be qualitative or quantitative in our minds. 
 
Problems with Existing Models 
While the Minority Group model is seen by many as a large improvement 
over the Medical Model, both still have their flaws. One major flaw that resides 
in the Medical Model, and possibly in the Minority Group Model, is that this 
model creates categories of normal and disabled which can often become 
conflated with notions of what “should be.” DePoy and Gilson point out that this 
notion of what “should” be, which is quite societally ingrained, is one we should 
be suspicious of because “it prescribes what should be from observation of what 
is most typical… reifying frequent as most desirable.”20 Our models of disability 





individual and their variations from the norm or from what “should” be. DePoy 
and Gilson state: “The judgment regarding typical and atypical appearance of 
bodies, body parts, and mannerisms and adornments is… context-bound.”21 
Being deaf or hard of hearing (HOH) will always be normal in schools for the 
deaf and HOH. In that context, it would be hard to have the sense that the 
student should be able to hear. Having Brachydactyly will always be normal 
when I gather with my father, my sister Tara, my uncle Dave, and my cousin 
Rachelle (and other relatives) for holidays; it is simply an unsurprising fact when 
you gather enough Barneses together.  
In Deborah Beth Creamer’s Disability and Christian Theology, she points out 
some of the flaws that she sees in the existing models of disability theory. The 
Medical Model, she states, “emphasizes body parts, ignoring the identity of the 
whole person.”22 She suggests that we often fail to see beyond the atypical body a 
person may posses and miss the social struggles (a major identity piece for many 
people with disabilities) of these same individuals. This failure to see beyond the 
person’s atypical body often puts outsiders and nondisabled people in the 
position to be the determiners of who is “disabled,” in turn leading to 






identity. Likewise, “healing” or perhaps more commonly, though less 
appropriately, “fixing” is often the driver of this perspective, reinforcing the idea 
that the person is not acceptable, or is at least less acceptable, as is.  
On the other hand, the Minority Group Model, Creamer states, stresses 
too much the disabled identity of people with disabilities to the neglect of other, 
often highly significant identity pieces a person possesses such as sexuality or 
ethnicity and can ignore the negative experiences of people with disabilities. The 
very particular challenges that people with varying disabilities may face are 
often disregarded by the Minority Group Model in pursuit of social solidarity 
between people with disabilities. I would add that these same challenges are 
often disregarded or emphasized by the broader public and as such the fellow 
individual with a disability plays into many of the same issues presented by 
“temporarily-abled”23 people. Where the Medical Model promotes an over 
emphasis on change and “fixing,” the Minority Model has the capacity to 
emphasize acceptance to the point of frowning upon the notion that any sort of 
healing is needed. 
 







As a third way of thinking about disability to be considered in tandem 
with these two, Creamer proposes a “limits model” of disability which 
understands disability as the full collection of limits that a person possesses, 
many of which will be common to all people.24 For example, without the aid of 
external devices, no person can fly, no person can breathe underwater, no person 
can withstand the pressure at the bottom of the ocean for an extended period, 
etc. Given that such limits are applicable to all people, she calls these limits, 
“unsurprising.”25 Each person has experienced limits and as such no person 
should be surprised by them. It is a common experience for all of humanity to 
come up against some of life’s obstacles and say “my body, or mind, has too 
many limits to overcome this obstacle.” Where a temporarily-abled person might 
come up against a mountain or a wall and say “I cannot,” a person in a 
wheelchair might come up against a flight of stairs, or perhaps worse, a single 
step, and say, “I cannot.” The obstacles vary and the limits vary, but the 
experience of limits is common and indeed universal for all humanity. 
While people with disabilities may experience more limits than other 









She points to the example of a person in a wheelchair. Rather than looking at the 
person and considering what the person is “not,” as one would be prone to do 
operating under the medical model, we may ask how this person’s limits 
compare to one’s own and may find that this person is not so different from 
one’s self. Creamer’s emphasis on what a given person’s limits “may enable or 
make difficult”27 allows each person to ask what one’s limits allow him or her to 
do that is out of the ordinary (if anything28) and what things the person’s limits 
make difficult. This assumption of similarity, that both people have limits, is 
essential and liberatory as it can have the capacity to bring the nondisabled 
individual into a position that involves some level of kinship with the person in 
the wheelchair, beginning the work of freeing that person from their social 
minority status. 
 The fundamental nature of my disorder is such that my limitations are 
rather unique. Some of these limitations have workarounds and others do not. 
My limitations are even different from my other family members who also have 
Brachydactyly. In other people’s attempts to understand my experience, I have 









capable of things I am not actually capable of, or, worst of all, have been 
assumed to somehow possess benefits from my unconventionally shaped hands. 
Some even assume that such “benefits” “balance out” my limitations or 
somehow are the reason for my aptitude at some manual skills such as 
drumming or playing piano. 
The disabled body, and I should also state, my disabled body, is often 
“read” or experienced by the culture with a strong sense of discomfort and/or 
uncertainty. With questions in mind such as, “Can that person lead a normal life? 
Is this person perpetually suffering because of the disability they possess? Does 
this person desire a different life, body, or brain?” the person is easily lost to the 
limits perceived. While I happen to be someone who will often readily volunteer 
information about my disability and make jokes about it casually, it is interesting 
to me the varying points in my relationships at which people have felt it will be 
ok to ask me about my disability. Will it be hours, weeks, years, or maybe even 
mere seconds? Each of these has occurred. At what point has this person 
determined that I will not be angry at or hurt by their curiosity? Has this person 
considered that at all? At what point has this person determined they have the 
right to know, or at least, ask about my hands? When is the appropriate time to 
ask “So what’s the deal with…”? Likewise, when is right for me to ask a fellow 
disabled person about their body? Am I allowed to know more because of our 
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shared identity? Am I in some way safer to share information with than a 
nondisabled person? Will I understand my fellow disabled person in ways that a 
nondisabled person never could? Just because society may or may not lump us 
together as disabled, does that make us social kin somehow? I believe all these 
questions are deserving of deliberation. 
At the risk of running into some problematic universalizing, I would like 
to propose as well that limits can affect the yet unmentioned spiritual dimension 
of our lives. While it may not be fair to say that an envious person has a 
disability, certainly this envy creates certain limits for that person as they 
experience their struggle with envy. What challenges might the envious person 
face in having compassion for someone whom this person believes has a happier 
life? Or for a person whom the envious one perceives to be more intelligent, 
attractive, or wealthy? Likewise, what limits are created for an individual with a 
bent towards lust or slothfulness or telling lies? While one might well suggest, 
and I would agree, that there may be psychological limits associated with any 
such proclivity, I think it is important not to disregard the spiritual dimension of 
such a limit. This is a dimension western theologians are apt to neglect.  Yet 
western theologians have also been quick to neglect the importance of the body 
by subtle appeals to Platonic dualisms. We are more than just our minds, we are 
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more than just our bodies; we are mind, body, and spirit and any or all of these 
three aspects of our lives may have limits. 
 
Universality, Individuality and Autonomy 
 
 A major pitfall to avoid in this conversation about limits and their 
universality is an overemphasis on the limits, or disability, of all people. It is true 
that all people do indeed possess limits. As well, the disabled are quick to call 
those without disabilities “the nondisabled,” a subversive act against the binary 
into which we, the disabled, are so readily placed and because of which some of 
us may be dismissed. This same binary, if we embrace the limits model to some 
extent, really should be transformed into a spectrum, or perhaps some sort of 
multidimensional chart with physical, emotional, cognitive and spiritual limits 
on each axis, without any value placed on where one lands on the chart. Yet it is 
important to emphasize the differences in points of view and life style between 
people with disabilities and the so called “temporarily abled,” and the 
understandings involved therein. This is the same sort of issue that arises when 
people try to state “All Lives Matter” in response to the Black Lives Matter 
movement: it misses the social and contextual particularity of the group of 
people who are suffering. People with disabilities, or perhaps, people with more 
severe limits, here and now, are dealing with a variety of social and 
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environmental pressures that our nondisabled counterparts are not. It would be 
wrong for my close, childhood friend with dyslexia to assume that he 
understands the full extent of my day to day obstacles just because he has a hard 
time reading. By that same token, it would be wrong for me to presume to 
understand what he might deal with at work or in his social life because he is a 
much slower reader than I.  
 As the only person in the world who understands my limitations and 
capabilities as well as I do, I find myself sensing a deep need to be able to define 
my own limits and abilities. As a person who is, in many ways, unlike other 
people with Brachydactyly, and even unlike the family members I was raised 
with who have similarly nonconventional bodies, the sense of individuality that I 
experience is shared with many people who have many types of bodies that have 
many types of limits. Friends, family members, scientists, and other outsiders 
may attempt to understand the unique bodies and minds of people with 
disabilities at varying times through varying means. However, these same 
people can only come so far, even after a lifetime spent with a person who has a 
disability. Yet with Bonhoeffer, I may say of Christ: “The [person] whom I am, 
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Jesus has also been. Of him only is it valid to say that nothing human was alien 
to him.”29 
Here it is essential to state the importance of allowing the individual to 
determine what is enabled and what is rendered difficult or impossible, rather 
than any other disabled or nondisabled person. While a disability such as my 
own enables me to be more aware of the physical, literal shape of the world 
around me, the thickness and texture of the things I grab, and the ease, or lack 
thereof, with which someone like myself may grip said items, I have not felt 
physically enabled to do anything out of the ordinary. Yet other’s have 
attempted to state for me: “He is a gifted musician because of his small hands.” 
As though somehow the reduced grip that results from my short fingers has the 
secret, hidden advantage of allowing me to drum more rhythmically, strike a 
piano chord with more grace, or strum a mandolin with more precision while 
reaching some hidden chord structures. I can assure you none of the above are 
true. While I have learned to rapidly adapt to situations and objects that were not 
designed with hands like mine in mind, I have not yet found any “advantages” 
that I can derive from my disability. The issue lies in the assumption. Others read 
my body as skilled and disabled, they then assume there must be a secret trick 





seeming to come from well meaning people, are still laced with a subtext that 
suggests it is not dedication to my craft but a hidden advantage that has enabled 
my skill. As though this disability, which I have yelled at God for, which has 
kept me from doing many things, which has led to embarrassment any time I 
drop anything, somehow has a secret other side that “balances it all out” and that 
negates any ill will I may feel toward God for “knitting me together” in this way. 
This narrative is all too common and I am no anomaly for having this story to 
accompany my disability. 
 
God’s Limits as Seen in Christ 
 
If we put some stock in Creamer’s Limits Model, and in orthodox 
Christology, then when we turn to Christ, we should not be surprised that God 
incarnate, the fully human Christ, would also have experienced physical, 
emotional, cognitive and even spiritual limits in his earthly life. One sees Christ 
experiencing what Creamer might call the “unsurprising limits” of hunger 
(Matthew 4:2), thirst (John 19:28), tiredness (Mark 4:38), and other limits of 
corporeality throughout the four gospels. By nature of being fully God and fully 
human, we must say also the Christ both did and did not possess omnipotence 
and omniscience, so then what cognitive or emotional limits might he have 
possessed? This turn of events, the omnipotent assuming limits, an attribute 
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equally important as any other essential human attribute, would prove to be the 
source of our salvation. Limits, in this situation, enabled the salvation of human 
kind. It cannot be understated that Christ would not have been truly human 
without the assumption of these same limits. Since the New Testament exhorts 
us to be Christlike and because limits acted for our salvation in God through 
Christ, it is worth our while to ask what it might mean to take on what we could 
call a “Christlike limitedness.” This, discussion will be continued later, for now 
we will dwell further upon the nature of the incarnation and what it means that 




 This notion of Christ assuming human attributes, what is called in Latin 
the Communicatio Idiomatum, meaning the communication (or “assumption”) of 
idioms or attributes for our salvation is well summarized by this statement from 
4th century theologian Gregory of Nazienzus: “That which he has not assumed he 
has not healed; but that which is united to His Godhead is also saved.”30 Gregory 
here is attempting to refute Apollinarianism, a theological view which heretically 
stated that Christ had a human body but a divine mind thus suggesting that God 
did not actually experience the fullness of humanity. Gregory, by contrast, insists 
																																																								
30	Gregory of Nazianzus, Epistle 101 to Cledonius the Priest against Apollinarius, par. 5 
(CCEL).	
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that for our redemption to be total, Christ must have taken on a body, a mind, 
and all that it means to be human, including the limits contained therein. If 
Christ had not taken on this fullness, Gregory states that it would be as if: “a 
man's eye had been injured and his foot had been injured in consequence, [and] 
you were to attend to the foot and leave the eye uncared for.”31 Quite in contrast, 
Gregory would say that everything that was “communicated” to Christ, all the 
“idioms” or attributes that are essential to humanity, has been saved and 
transformed by the divine taking them on. As Dietrich Bonhoeffer puts it: “Of 
[Christ] only is it valid to say that nothing human was alien to him.”32 This is the 
essence of the communicatio idiomatum. This incarnational model was further 
developed and expanded upon by Saint Athanasius. 
 
Athanasius and the Incarnation 
 
In its simplest form, orthodox Christology states that Jesus Christ was 
both fully God and fully human. The communicatio idiomatum, especially Saint 
Athanasius’ rendering of it, extends this notion to say that the fullness of God 
and fullness of humanity were pressed inextricably close together by their 







Nicene theology who explained the communicatio idiomatum as such: “… the 
Savior rightly put on a body, in order that the body, being interwoven with life, 
might no longer remain as mortal in death, but, as having put on immortality, 
henceforth it might, when arising, remain immortal”33 As such, what it means to 
be human is forever changed because divinity and humanity have been 
comingled; that which has been assumed, the fullness of humanity, everything 
that it means to be fully human, has been saved. 
 Athanasius made most of his arguments in defense of Nicene theology, 
the goal of which was primarily to determine the nature of the incarnation and to 
refute Nestorianism which suggested that the two natures of Christ were not 
fully united. Athanasius thoroughly emphasizes the fullness of God being 
present in, yet untainted by, the human body of Jesus of Nazareth and the power 
of Christ the incorruptible taking on a human body. This emphasis shows the 
value he places on the very notion of the incarnation and the importance to him 
of the fully human nature of Christ: Christ lacked nothing that it meant to be 
human. Athanasius and the rest of the Nicene theologians’ goal was realized in 
what became the orthodox affirmation of Nicaea that Christ was fully human 





 One of the major points of Athanasius’ Christology that is germane to 
disability and theology is the corruptible/incorruptible paradox contained in the 
fact that Christ, who was incorruptible by nature of being God, took on a body 
which was corruptible, by nature of being human. Athanasius states in his 
“Refutation of the Gentiles” that “while using the body as an instrument, [Christ] 
partook of none of the body’s properties, but rather himself sanctified even the 
body.”34 It is important for us to note here that “properties,” in Athanasius’ 
language, are elements which are common but not intrinsic to a human being. 
These are things like femininity, African heritage, or balding. One is likely to see 
people with any or all of these “properties” on any given day, but no one would 
say that a person is not human simply because they lack one or all of them. As 
such, we may say that Christ was fully human while still saying that he did not 
take on all the “properties” of humanity, such as sinfulness.35  
 Within this Christological framework, a subtle but key point to 
Athanasius’ view of the body, Christ, and the work Christ rendered unto the 
human body, is that Christ was raised from the dead still incorruptible, but 
possessing scars and unhealed wounds. As Athanasius puts it: “the Lord erected 







raising it from the dead…”36 In response to this, one might ask how Athanasius 
can rightly call a scarred, hole-ridden body “holy” and “incorruptible.” In the 
simplest sense, and rather by contrast to some of the Old Testament’s teachings, 
one can see in the resurrected Christ that wounds and scars no longer corrupt a 
body. Rather, one may rise from the grave, to eternal life, still bearing the marks 
of the earthly life that preceded the eternal life. In Athanasius’ view these marks 
on the body do not equate to corruption of the body. Christ’s work of 
interweaving life itself into the formerly, merely mortal body is not undone by 
limits and scars but rather may include them. 
 Additionally, just as all things were made through Christ at the outset of 
creation, Athanasius affirms that humanity is re-created through Christ, which 
would be the only fitting way to re-create God’s creation since Christ was the 
vehicle of the initial creative act.37 For a time, before the re-creation wrought by 
Christ, salvation was a matter of the aforementioned “properties.” One needed to 
be born Jewish or become Jewish, or if one lived before the Jews, then one 
needed sacrifices for one’s atonement. In the re-creation, these properties became 







humanity. God has now woven eternal life into the existence of the “rational”38 
creatures. However, “rationality” in Athanasius’ work is used rather differently 
than in contemporary English. 
In Athanasius’ writings, the term “rational” is the word logikos (logikos). 
Athanasius is using a play on words from the root logos (logos), or “word,” or in 
this case, divine “Word.”39 Rationality, for Athanasius, is not a function of the 
mind but of the soul and has to do with the welcoming of the presence of the 
Word rather than with one’s capacity for logical thought, what most of us today 
would call “rationality.” This is important to emphasize as it demonstrates for 
the reader that Athanasius does not make any assumptions about the capacity of 
one’s mind relative to one’s capacity to experience salvation. The Word has been 
just as thoroughly woven into the bodies and minds of the already disabled as to 
the bodies of the not-yet-disabled. The troubled or limited mind is still logikos, 
rational, capable of perceiving and receiving the logos, the Savior.  
 
Bonhoeffer’s Christology of Who 
 
  20th century, Lutheran theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer also put significant 







book posthumously compiled from his lectures on Christology, he states that the 
communicatio idiomatum represents the “mutual participation and exchange of the 
individual properties40 of the natures.”41 He goes on to state as well that because 
of this “mutual participation and exchange,” we can now say of the human 
Christ anything that we would say of God. As such, Bonhoeffer suggests that 
even God’s more profound attributes, like omnipresence, have now been 
conveyed to the human Christ. As Bonhoeffer quotes from the Formula of 
Concord, “here is the highest communion which God truly has with man 
assumed…”42 Bonhoeffer also emphasizes two further ideas about what the 
communicatio idiomatum makes possible, which can be summed up as: we can say 
nothing of Jesus’ humanity that we would not also say of his deity and 
everything God accomplished in Christ was through the human flesh of Jesus of 
Nazareth. 
Because of the very dramatic change that has occurred in humans via the 
incarnation, Bonhoeffer states that, “God’s Word carries the destroying lightning 
and the life-giving rain. As Word, it destroys and creates the truth.”43 The old 











near the Lord’s offering44 has been destroyed as the new truth was revealed by 
the holy of holies, the divine presence being one of the natures which dwelt in 
Christ as he bled out and was blemished on the cross. Bleeding was assumed and 
healed. Blemishes were assumed and healed. The question becomes what does it 
mean that the suffering of humankind has been assumed, and as such, has been 
healed on the cross and through the incarnation? We will return to this question. 
A final piece of Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s Christology that is germane to our 
discussion is the idea that we must ask “Who” rather than “How” as we 
approach the Christ. As he puts it: “’Who?’, is simply the religious question. It is 
the question about the other person and [that person’s]45 claim… Questions of 
transcendence and of existence become questions concerning the person.”46 
Bonhoeffer goes on to state that our entire approach to Christology should be to 
learn about Christ from the Christ himself. As the Word and direct revelation of 
God, we have no better way to approach God than through Christ. We must, 
Bonhoeffer says, go to the “place where the Person [of Christ] reveals himself in 












Christ available…”47 Since Christ’s body is no longer present to us, we are now 
left to approach the Christ through his “humiliation” via the “Word,” the 
“Sacrament” and the “Congregation.”48 However, this humiliation is only a 
humiliation because of Christ’s glory relative to our own sinful flesh. Word, 
Sacrament, and Congregation are only humiliating loci for Christ’s presence by 
virtue of relativity, not in and of themselves. 
 
Interweaving, Healing, and Suffering 
In the understanding of the incarnation that comes with the communicatio 
idiomatum, people with disabilities have a friend and sibling who understands 
them perfectly. While we have no reason to think that Christ had Brachydactyly, 
dyslexia, autism, or any other disability for that matter, we know that he 
experienced all that it means to be human. As we will see, we can confidently 
state, that Christ suffers with us even now. Christ experiences the embarrassment 
I feel when I drop a glass because I cannot hold onto it, the shame I feel when I 
cannot open a jar with a large lid, and the fear I feel when I consider what 
opportunities my children might miss out on if they inherit this genetic defect 







we feel the deep sense of inadequacy that sometimes comes with “living, 
moving, and having our being” in a limited or disabled body. 
 This interweaving of life eternal into the formerly mortal body is at the 
crux of the earlier statement from Gregory of Nazienzus: “That which he has not 
assumed, he has not healed.”49 What then has Christ healed? One can see that 
Christ assumed hunger, thirst, emotional pain, love of his fellow humans, loss of 
relationship, the trauma and abuse that preceded the cross, and finally his death 
upon the cross itself. One could extend this list with a close reading of any of the 
gospels but one might infer, as proponents of the communicatio idiomatum have, 
that Christ has healed every essential human experience; he has redeemed every 
part of the human nature that is common to all of humanity. As mentioned 
before, this does not necessarily include what Athanasius called the properties.  
 One of the things that has been assumed into the Godhead, through the 
person of Christ, is human suffering. One can also say, if abiding in this line of 
thinking, that Christ healed suffering, and if one counts death among the forms 
of suffering, then the experience of suffering must be counted as essential to the 
human condition; is it is a fate experienced by all. Christ experienced severe 
physical suffering on Good Friday, underwent some level of emotional suffering 





Judas, and almost certainly experienced other forms of human suffering as well. 
One even sees Jesus continuing to bear the marks of his suffering after he is 
resurrected in the form of scars on his hands, feet, and sides. If one reads Isaiah 
53 in a Messianic fashion, one can state that Christ was indeed “a man of 
suffering and acquainted with infirmity” (Isa 53:3 NRSV) and that this aspect of 
Christ’s humanity, no less than any other, followed him beyond the resurrection. 
What then should one make of this bold notion that Christ has “healed” 
suffering? If the Word, by whom life was created, has been intertwined with 
suffering, perhaps we may say that one can still find “life” in the depths of their 
deepest pain. Or maybe this pain may now be found to be meaningful rather 
than merely being a senseless aspect of our mortal condition.50 How, too, is our 
suffering different now than it was before the arrival of Christ? Athanasius 
suggests “one who heals and teaches does not simply sojourn, but is of service to 
those in need, and appears as those who need him can bear, lest by exceeding the 
need of those who suffer he trouble [them].”51 Athanasius insists that the healing 
and teaching work of Christ in the world was for the benefit of humankind; he 
suffered for our sake. That humanity might see suffering that redeems, that 








humanity might see God’s own self (i.e. Christ) be forsaken by God without 
turning his back on God and learn what it means to endure God’s silence. With 
the very source of life interwoven into our suffering, perhaps we might learn 
how to suffer rightly. And perhaps those who suffer less, or perhaps even 
impose suffering, wittingly or unwittingly, might see what it means to be an 
effective co-sufferer, as Christ was unto all of humanity as well as unto his 
contemporary followers. 
While I have relatively little suffering to speak about here as a white man 
from an upper-middle class family in a first world nation, I do feel the need to 
try to address this question of how suffering can possibly have been healed in 
Christ, at very least in relation to my own suffering. My only answer to this 
question comes from the knowledge that God suffered as a human. God taking 
on full humanity, when under no obligation to do so, can be thought of as the 
greatest empathetic act of all time. I know that God has experienced frustration 
at the human body and embarrassment at its shortcomings. While the omniscient 
God surely “knew” what these things were like before the advent of Christ, God 
“knows” now in a categorically different, deeper, experiential way. In the sort of 
way that creates mutual understanding and a desire for shared identity amongst 
people with disabilities. In the sort of way that allows God to say, “I understand” 
like my own father, from whom I inherited my physical condition, has said “I 
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understand” in those few moments when we have discussed our physical 
limitations together. 
With this understanding of the incarnation and the remarkable 
conclusions we can draw from it, we may say, with Athanasius, that Christ truly 
and experientially knows all that it means to suffer humanly. When we suffer, 
we are not alone in either our pain or in what our pain might mean. Now, we can 
turn to the idea of the co-suffering Christ, and the co-suffering community that 
his body, the Church, one of the humiliating media we have for accessing Christ, 
is called to be. While his body, the church, certainly fails often in this mission of 
co-suffering, we may also ask how we may grow in our practices of co-suffering 
in a truly Christlike manner.  
As we consider the profundity of this ultimate empathic act, perhaps the 
Church can ask itself how it might model a truly Christlike empathy. Perhaps for 
a person with more severe needs, a day spent helping a person with a disability 
as they need it could lead a nondisabled person into understanding and co-
suffering in a Christlike way. Or for someone more willing and able to discuss 
their struggles, a time spent in “holy listening,” a way of listening that does not 
question but simply accepts a person’s story, could open their eyes to the lived 
reality of a person with a disability. Likewise, many disability theologians have 
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offered up their own models and ideas for how this kind of empathic co-
suffering can occur. 
 
Frameworks and Practices for Co-suffering 
 
The Communion of Struggle 
 
 One framework for considering our practices of how we may co-suffer 
with people with disabilities comes from Nancy Eiesland. In her pioneering book 
The Disabled God, Nancy Eiesland suggests that just as people with disabilities or 
nonconventional bodies may find that they have a body in which they struggle, 
or a “body of struggle,” the Church may view itself as a “communion of 
struggle.”52 We, the church, are often a broken and dysfunctional body trying to 
make our way in a world that may or may not have been made, as my professor 
said, “With people like us in mind.” If one wants to use Saint Paul’s analogy of 
the church as a body in tandem with Eiesland’s, we might say that the eyes of 
our body are often short-sighted, the hands are often too tightly clenched, and 
the muscles are rarely able to work together, leading to all manner of struggles 
just to coordinate our ecumenical and ecclesial efforts. We, the church catholic, 





Yet, as Eiesland says, we are also a “communion of conversion,”53 a 
communion that is meant to grow spiritually and emotionally, to learn from one 
another through our differences, and to experience the renewal that comes from 
the presence of the most high in our midst via the Holy Spirit, the person of 
Christ, and the humiliating media. This second aspect we may say with even 
more conviction as we consider that God is not only present in the invisible, 
omnipotent sense, but he is present now as a resurrected human. Jesus of 
Nazareth, who has walked the earth in a body like ours and who understands 
humanity from within, via direct experience is present with us. Likewise, Jesus 
lived in the communion of struggle with his disciples as they followed him and 
attempted to learn what Christ’s church on earth would look like. Our 
communion of struggle ought to be a communion undergoing conversion 
towards empathic co-suffering. 
Another important aspect of Eiesland’s idea of the “communion of 
struggle” is her insistence that the biblical image of the resurrection is in no way 
about the negation of the experience of disability or limits in exchange for a 
perfect body. Christ rises from the grave scarred, with a hole still in his side. 
Rather, nonconforming bodies can, and do, participate in the imago Dei. Despite 




corporeal, body of Christ in our churches. Thus, any efforts to remove or limit 
the participation of people with disabilities in our churches is tantamount to 
shooting ourselves in the foot. As Christians, we need to be aware of our own 
attempts to hide or negate people with disabilities among us. They too are part of 
the body and reflect the Imago Dei. 
 
Suffering, Co-Suffering, and Remembering 
 
John Swinton, one of the most prolific disability theologians currently 
writing, points out that, just as most Christians believe that Christ suffers with 
the broad sweep of humanity during the course of our lives because of his 
closeness to us, we may also assert that he suffers quite specifically with the 
disabled; we are not left out of the equation. As well, Christ is not merely 
empathetic, he is a co-sufferer.54 Swinton goes on to drive home the point that if 
the church wishes to do this very Christ-ian work of co-suffering with the people 
with disabilities our best vehicle for doing so is through friendship.55 This cannot 
be merely “missionary” friendship, however, there must be genuine valuing of 
the other person and desiring to build friendship with the person, even if it 








An important starting point for building these friendships is to work 
towards overcoming attitudes that treat people with disabilities as being 
somehow “other.” Some people with cognitive or emotional disabilities suffer or 
endure symptoms that make social connection very difficult. Swinton specifically 
focuses on schizophrenia as an example. He states: “…particular symptoms and 
experiences that the [schizophrenic] person encounters makes normal 
communication and relational interaction extremely difficult… Consequently the 
other person is experienced as somehow ‘other’ and lines of communication and 
relationship collapse.”56 These failed connections lead to attitudes that often turn 
people into an “other” and that is how we create “the schizophrenic.”57 While 
some people will have limitations that make even basic conversation and relating 
impossible, such as extreme dementia or Alzheimer’s, we may still connect with 
these people as we acknowledge that they can still feel and relate in some 
capacity. This remembrance is essential to retaining the personhood and 
humanity of these same people. 
 Within the church this means making an intentional process of 
“remembering” those whose humanity we so easily forget and turn into objects. 







as oppressors, memories that make us uncomfortable and call us back into 
critical solidarity with the oppressed.58 Swinton even goes so far as to say that 
this sort of practice “forms the essence of the kingdom.”59 He goes on to say, “In 
remembering someone, we acknowledge the person as worthy of memory, and 
acceptable as a full person.”60 
 I cannot help but think here of a strong contrast to this concept of 
remembering as seen in the life of the fictional character Charlie Gordon from the 
book Flowers for Algernon. In Flowers for Algernon, the protagonist Charlie is a 
severely mentally handicapped individual who undergoes scientific testing to 
see if his condition can be changed to the point that he can become at all “cured” 
from his condition. The operation is a “success,” and as his IQ grows and he 
becomes increasingly intelligent, he begins to have memories of his life before 
the operation. One such memory is from his childhood when he was taken to a 
doctor to see if he could be “fixed.” Charlie’s parents were frustrated by the fact 
that he was mentally disabled and found a doctor who claimed he could “cure” 
Charlie. Although the doctor turned out to be a con-artist who charged Charlie’s 









doctor. He liked the doctor because he was one of the only people who had ever 
treated him like a person.61 Never mind the fact that Charlie’s parents said they 
loved him and provided for him, they did not treat him like he was human and 
so they failed him. I hope that we in the church are struck by the importance of 
this simple act of remembering one another’s humanity. 
 
The Virtue of Attentiveness 
 Very much in agreement with Swinton’s suggestion that the church 
engage the practice of friendship with the disabled, Richard B. Steele suggests 
that we develop four virtues for use in caring for people who cannot care for 
themselves. He defines the term virtue here as “a praiseworthy character trait, a 
kind of moral or spiritual strength, which a person must deliberately 
cultivate…”62 While all four of his suggested virtues are of value in the practice 
of ministry to and with people with disabilities, I want to focus here specifically 
on what Steele calls the virtue of attentiveness. This virtue of attentiveness he 
describes as: “the habitual practice of connecting with people… simply because 
they are people… it is a rare virtue because it takes such self-restraint for one to 
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show love to those who problems one may not be able to solve…”63 This is a love 
based on allowing the other person to be what they are, to allow that person to 
define their own limits, and to decide what help they want rather than forcing 
them to accept whatever help may be given. We might even call this the virtue of 
unimposing service, allowing people with disabilities to determine what limits 
they want help with and which they would rather deal with on their own.  
This way of attentive interacting deconstructs the problematic aspects of 
the Medical Model while simultaneously reinforcing the fact that people with 
disabilities have just as much right to self-definition as the non-disabled do. It 
also forces the one who would desire to help to be sure that they actually are 
helping, not just imposing their “service,” and that they are coming to know the 
person they desire to help. Attentiveness as a virtue has the capacity to be 
transformative because, when applied properly, it forces the one who would try 
to help to change their actions from being generically “Christian service” 
oriented to “Christlike friendship” oriented. This is a change that takes the 
actions from being about what the non-disabled person is supposed to do, to 
what builds relationship between the people, and what serves the person with a 






 As a compliment to Steele’s concept of the virtue of attentiveness, I also 
want to draw on Martin Buber’s concept, found in his seminal text “I and Thou,” 
of the two primal words “I-Thou” and “I-It.” In Buber’s concept, one speaks “I-
It” and treats a person64 as “It” when one presumes to know something about the 
person that has not been received in authenticity. That is, whatever the person 
presumes to know, is not something that they have received from the person, but 
is rather something that they have conjured up about who they deem that person 
to be, or what they deem them to be like. However, and this is the higher though 
not always possible ideal, we may also speak “I-Thou” and so treat a person as 
“Thou:”  
The primary word I–Thou can be spoken only with the whole being. 
Concentration and fusion into the whole being can never take place 
through my agency, nor can it ever take place without me. I become 
through my relation to the Thou; as I become I, I say Thou. All real living 
is meeting.65  
 
In essence, Buber is stating that two people have to meet one another with the 










whom they are attempting to connect with: one must present their attentive, 
authentic self and receive the same from the other in order to speak “I-Thou.” 
 Both words are necessary and both are powerful for humankind. Early in 
his text Buber summarizes the words by saying, “As experience, the world 
belongs to the primary word I–It. The primary word I–Thou establishes the 
world of relation.”66 Here Buber is stating that most of our time is spent 
experiencing the world and the many “Its”, or things, that we encounter with our 
senses and our interpersonal interactions. However, sometimes humanity can 
also move beyond this into what Buber calls the “spirit”67 where we relate to 
some “Thou” whom we treat with full, receptive, dignity:  
“Spirit is not in the I, but between I and Thou… like the air in which you 
breathe. [A person] lives in the spirit, if [they are] able to respond to [their] 
Thou. [This person] is able to, if [they enter] into relation with [their] 
whole being. Only in virtue of [their] power to enter into relation is [the 
person] able to live in the spirit.”68,69 
 
 The connection between Buber’s concept of I-Thou and self-definition, and 
its capacity for transforming our conception of people with disabilities is 













assumptions onto them, presume to know their struggles, presume to know 
what they are capable of, then in any of those processes, and many others, we 
speak the I-It word. When we allow the person to speak for oneself, present 
ourselves as willing to listen, and proactively avoid imposing our ideas, we 
speak the I-Thou word. This is the life-giving word that allows for full humanity 
on the part of both the speaker and the receiver. As Buber states, it is not always 
possible to speak the I-Thou Word because of the effort required on the part of 
the speaker and the hearer to say it. However, when it comes to people with 
disabilities and other disenfranchised groups, I would suggest that it is our duty 
as Christians to go out of our way to extend the I-Thou word. Where our 
churches, governments or institutions may disenfranchise, it is our task to help 
rehumanize these people who have been made into caricatures and attempt to 
aid in restoring them to their fully human status. Attentiveness will help with 
this process. Likewise, recognizing that even if we do not self identify as 
disabled, we too can identify as having our own limits. This may be the first step 
towards speaking the I-Thou word. Just as Christ emptied himself to become 
human, we also must empty ourselves to become human, at least in Buber’s 
conception of humanity. Just as this act was profound and salvific coming from 
Christ, this act coming from his bride the Church may act to build up and 
encourage his body. 
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Theology Via the Body 
 
 Returning to Nancy Eiesland, an important part of her work, which 
Creamer also speaks to heavily, is the importance of understanding that all 
people interact with the world and do theology through and with their bodies. 
Where feminists and liberationists have emphasized the feminine, colored or 
impoverished body, writers in the world of disability and theology emphasize 
the “medically” unconventional body as it reads and is read by the world that 
surrounds it. Theology is impossible without a body with which to do it and it is 
modernity’s arrogance that leads us to believe we should, or even that we can, 
disregard our physical context as we consider God. A recognition of the world 
and its make up is impossible without a body. For people with disabilities, the 
awareness of the embodiment of their theology is often very present already. 
Eiesland states this most poignantly as such:  
The corporeal is for people with disabilities the most real… we become 
keenly aware that our physical selves determine our perceptions of the 
social and physical world. These perceptions, like our bodies, are often 







Eiesland points out that those of us with disabled bodies are even more aware of 
our embodiment because we are aware of the many ways in which the world 
was made for people very unlike ourselves.  
 John Swinton takes this notion a step further as he states, “The full 
revelation of love requires bodies and not just words.”71 The body in which we 
move about has the capacity to be a vehicle for the love of God, or for nefarious 
or neglectful forces. For the non-disabled, Swinton says, this remembrance is 
essential as for many people, especially those with more severe mental limits, the 
Christian community maybe the closest thing to a concept of God that they ever 
encounter. One could, and I might, argue that the role of the Holy Spirit can be 
diminished in this proclamation. However, assuming that the work of the Holy 
Spirit somehow gets any Christians off the hook in representing the love of 
Christ to people with disabilities, is to assume that Christians have no role to 
play in shining the light of Christ in the world, which would be a most troubling 
claim. 
In talking about the struggle of writing her memoir about her life with 
multiple sclerosis, Catholic author Nancy Mairs states: “… no matter what I’m 







opposes the Western idea of mind body dualism proposed by Western culture 
and instead insists that all people, disabled or not, must come to terms with 
“ourselves as bodies.”73 Likewise, I am keenly aware of the size and texture of the 
everyday things I use with my hands and the ways in which these things are or 
are not easily used by hands like mine. Similarly, the blind may be aware of a 
lack of literature available in braille or audiobook formats at their local library. 
The wheelchair bound may be more aware of the lack of ramps in public places, 
and so it goes for many people with disabilities. The possibilities for what 
disabilities cause us to be aware of are endless.  
In the face of situations where limits pose significant challenges for people 
with disabilities, adaptation or exclusion are often our only options and every 
time that we weigh our options we feel the impact of what our bodies are like: 
unconventional, and perhaps, the environment would suggest, unwelcome. In 
some situations, the request for help may be a possibility, but only at the risk of 
exposing our need in a way contrary to the cultural values of independence and 
self-sufficiency so prevalent in contemporary Western culture. Some of my 
friends have been surprised to hear that I think about the shape of my hands an 






individuals with unconventional bodies or minds, I can imagine that there are 
plenty who think about their variances with far greater regularity. Hourly for 
some? Such physical variations may seem minute in comparison to being of a 
different gender, ethnic group, sexual orientation or any other of myriad identity 
pieces, but variations in physical ability are defining, and at times confining, both 
in how one perceives and in how one is perceived. Yet it is important to state as 
well, with Eiesland, that for many of us: “Embodying disability is not an 
extraordinary feat; rather it too is a process of symbolically and corporeally 
constructing wholeness and ordinary physicality.”74 
For the nondisabled, theological consideration of one’s own body has the 
capacity to be a transformative process. Asking one’s self how one’s body affects 
the way they receive others and how they are received by others can be a starting 
point for developing bodily awareness in ways that many people with 
disabilities are already aware of. As well, considering the way people with 
various disabilities interact with the world generally and the church specifically 
can be a helpful exercise in transforming our conception of people with 
disabilities. What is the experience of sacred music like for a deaf person? What 




these experiences shaping their conception of who God is? Our bodies strongly 
affect our experience of both worship and theology. 
 
Reflecting on and Defining One’s Own Limits 
 
 Disabled memoirist Nancy Mairs reflects on her own uncertainty in how 
to talk about her own disability and others’ in her book Waist-High in the World. 
In her introduction, she says, “How can I believe that my life is real when it feels 
so desperately provisional? Oddly I don’t consider the lives of other people with 
disabilities to be similarly inauthentic. Only my own seems flimsy and 
inauthentic.”75 She was thirty before the onset of her MS and has become 
increasingly impaired ever since because of this degenerative disease. Yet she 
describes, with a certain amount of tongue in cheek, being thankful for the 
process because such loss allows one to “grow incrementally into each loss and 
so more easily retain a modicum of composure throughout the process.”76 
 Mairs’ humor regarding her experience of disability is refreshing for me as 
person with an atypical body. Likewise, it is a tool I, and other people with 
disabilities I know, employ regularly to self-identify and to destigmatize or 







twisted and powerless but for two twelve-volt batteries beneath my ass. Woe is 
me!”77 feels akin to jokes I have made about coming up “short-handed,” about 
having a hard time “gripping” a concept, or other such remarks. The way Mairs 
uses humor allows her to put her disability to her own advantage. This is 
obviously an opportunity not all disabled people have, but is a tactic put to good 
use in her writing as she skillfully and often poignantly calls out the ridiculous 
ideas society has about what it means to be “normal.”  
Our society tries to keep people with disabilities from talking about our 
disabilities, but humor can be a subversive tool that allows us to speak about the 
aspects of our identity that so often make others uncomfortable. While it is rarely 
my goal to make people uncomfortable as I talk about my hands, it is a topic I 
rarely have the opportunity to discuss on my own terms. Often, I either express 
my frustrations about my limitations making others feel they need to be sorry for 
me, or someone asks me “What’s going on with your hands?” In response to this 
question my options hardly extend beyond either appearing overly self-
conscious as I inform the person that I do not feel like talking about it, or 
indulging their curiosity regardless of whether or not I want to talk about my 




can control and allows me to self define my limits and my identity in ways that I 
am comfortable with. 
Mairs defines her own limits, identity, and terms for herself in profound 
ways throughout the course of her memoir. She often calls herself a cripple, 
knowing that few other people in her situation would want to call themselves 
that and never calling anyone else a cripple. She explains that she does so as a 
way of being forthright about her own perception of her condition. This title 
allows her to define her situation for herself, to explain her identity, and even to 
have a chance to laugh at her own condition a bit as she says it.  
In total, Mairs demonstrates something of an ideal for people with 
disabilities, an ideal that is not always attainable. While I do not want to say that 
she has an ideal situation or somehow has an “easy” disability, she does present 
a few ways of living with a disabled body that the nondisabled would benefit 
from understanding and helping people with disabilities in their own lives to 
attain. Primarily she demonstrates the ability to define one’s own limits and 
terms for their life. She uses humor and writing to do this, but for those people 
with disabilities who are unable to do this, the church is called to advocate for 





 To bring this all together, I want to draw on a critique from John Swinton, 
originally directed towards Nancy Eiesland’s book The Disabled God:  
If autonomy, liberation, civil rights, self-representation and equal access to 
the political and ecclesiological systems are the goals of such [liberationist] 
approaches, then how are we to understand and make sense of those 
people whose impairments prevent them from ever being able to achieve 
or participate in such goals.78 
Here Swinton importantly emphasizes that as much as we may advocate for 
autonomy and self-definition on behalf of people with disabilities, we must 
remember that there are those who, by and large, cannot self advocate because of 
their disability, or because of their membership in an overly stifling society. This 
is where Swinton’s notion of co-suffering, Steele’s virtue of attentiveness, 
Creamer’s conceptualization of limits, and Eiesland’s liberationism all meet: in 
the place where the members of God’s church truly speak the I-Thou word to the 
person before them, suffering with that person, allowing that person to define 
their identity, and actively working on their behalf before political, ecclesial, and 
other authorities to proactively safeguard and advocate for the fullness of their 
humanity. I would even suggest that this is in keeping with the author of the 
book of James notion of pure religion:  
25But those who look into the perfect law, the law of liberty, and 
persevere, being not hearers who forget but doers who act—they will be 





the Father, is this: to care for orphans and widows in their distress, and to 
keep oneself unstained by the world. (James 1:25, 27) 
Where those who cannot self-advocate are marginalized, (orphans and widows 
in James context and some people with disabilities in our own) the rest of us 
must advocate on their behalf. 
However, before this advocacy can occur, it is important to know, and to 
attempt to understand the people for whom one advocates. We must speak the I-
Thou word unto these people to see their humanity and from there, we may act 
in advocacy for them. As Athanasius states: “the achievements of the Savior… 
are of such a kind and number that if anyone should wish to expound them he 
would be like those who gaze at the expanse of the sea and wish to count its 
waves.”79 The disabled God, the Christ, is truly worth our never-ending 
contemplation, and the person with a disability admittedly is not, however a 
further statement must be made here. Namely, that it is worth our while to 
assume that we have not yet fully understood the stories of our brothers and 
sisters with disabilities. While no person is likely to fit into the identity boxes we 
have created for them, it is of particular importance that we break down the 
identity boxes of righteous suffering, victim of genetics or incident, blessed or 
cursed by God, etc. for the sake of understanding the individual, the child of God 




“projects,” people we believe need healing, or people who are somehow 
“incomplete” as they are.  
As well, we should not consider any of this to be above or beyond the 
profound call God has placed on the lives of God’s people. Loving one another, 
and advocating for one another ought to be at the core of the identity of who 
God’s people consider themselves to be. The Christ took on limits, fully and 
deeply intertwined with humanity, and died so that we might see God incarnate 
acting out the will of God on the earth and modeling for us how we ought to live. 
The profundity of this act should not be lost on us. Rather by contrast, the 
incarnation should inspire us to do the work of God in small everyday actions, 
like acting with attentiveness and speaking the I-Thou word. Like allowing 
people with disabilities to define their capacities, their limits, and their identities 
in the ways that they want to. 
Maximus the Confessor, a 7th century saint, proclaimed in his writings 
what I consider one of the best possible practices for interacting with fellow 
believers, regardless of how our beliefs, identities, or spiritual praxes may align. 
Extrapolating on the words of Gregory of Nazienzus, Maximus states:  
we are clothed in the body of humiliation, and likewise we are subject to 
the manifold evils that arise from it because of its inherent weakness; and 
rather than magnifying ourselves over others in view of the inequality all 
around us, we should by prudent consideration even out the disparity of 
The	Communication	of	Limits	 58	
our nature, which in its own right is equal in honor, by filling other’s 
deficiencies with our own abundances.80 
 
Each of us has “deficiencies” and “abundances” as Maximus states, or perhaps 
“limits” and “gifts” as Creamer might call them. It is our duty as believers and 
disciples of Christ to use our abundances to aid others where they experience 
limits. The practices of “filling in” one another’s deficiencies should always be 
regulated by the one with more deficiencies, in as much as that is possible. For 
some identity groups, this is more easily accomplished than for others. For those 
who literally cannot speak, the challenges inherent in this effort are significant. 
Yet this is not a practice that we can neglect if we wish to faithfully fulfill the 
mission of Christ. Christ who, for love’s sake, in a twofold mystery, took on all 
the limits that come with being human that he might fill out all of our 
deficiencies. May Christ’s body the Church give from whatever abundances we 
need to, and take on whatever limitations are necessary, that we might, in some 
small way, do the same. 
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